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In the attraction effect, adding a dominated third option to a choice set of two options
can alter preferences for the original two options and increase the dominating option’s
choice share. This can constitute a violation of the axioms of regularity and indepen-
dence from irrelevant alternatives, which are core properties of any choice model in
which the utility of each option is stable across choice sets. In the past 20 years, the
attraction effect has driven the development of a set of influential models of multiat-
tribute choice. However, two studies (Frederick et al., 2014; Yang & Lynn, 2014)
involving a series of experiments with naturalistic choice options (e.g., snacks, movies)
found no evidence for the attraction effect in choice contexts where alternatives are
represented without objectively defined (e.g., numerical) attribute dimensions—a find-
ing that would severely undermine its theoretical importance. Huber et al. (2014)
criticized these studies, laying down a set of criteria that should be met by any
experiment wishing to test for the attraction effect in real-world consumer choices.
Based on these criteria, this article presents a carefully designed experiment testing the
attraction effect with movies as naturalistic choice options. The results show a precisely
zero attraction effect.
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The Attraction Effect
Imagine that you are having a nice meal in
a restaurant, and you are looking at the two
dessert options available on the menu:
cheesecake and pecan pie. You are torn be-
tween the creamy texture of the cheesecake
and the rich, nutty flavor of the pecan pie.
You resolve to have the cheesecake. As the
waiter approaches to take your order, he in-
forms you that a third dessert option, apple
pie—which you find quite bland—is also
available today. But now you have changed
your mind and decide to order the pecan pie.
Tsetsos et al. (2010) give just this hypotheti-
cal example: The availability of the third op-
tion, which you do not want, makes you
switch between the original two options.
This is an example of the attraction effect
(also known as asymmetric dominance effect).
The introduction of the apple pie (decoy) to the
choice set makes you more likely to choose the
pecan pie (target) over the cheesecake (compet-
itor). In essence, it states that when the decision
maker is indifferent between the target and the
competitor (pecan pie and cheesecake in the
example), the addition of an inferior decoy op-
tion that resembles the target (apple pie is sim-
ilar to pecan pie but is less liked by the decision
maker) increases the likelihood that the target
will be chosen.
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The attraction effect is important, because it
poses a challenge to all choice models that rely
on the assumption of simple scalability, which
holds when options in a choice set can be given
a scale value, and choice probability is repre-
sented as a monotone function of these scale
values (Trueblood et al., 2013). The attraction
effect also violates the property of indepen-
dence from irrelevant alternatives, which re-
quires that the relative choice probability of two
options should not be affected by adding new
options to the choice set (Pleskac, 2015). In
addition, the attraction effect can violate the
regularity condition, which states that an op-
tion’s choice probability cannot increase when
the choice set is extended (Luce, 1977; Tversky,
1972).
Due to its theoretical importance, the attrac-
tion effect has played a substantial role in the
evolution of multialternative, multiattribute
models of choice, with a significant number of
various theoretical accounts being developed
over the past 20 years (e.g., multialternative
decision field theory, Roe et al., 2001; leaky
competing accumulators, Usher & McClelland,
2004; multialternative attentional drift–diffu-
sion model, Krajbich et al., 2010; range-
normalization model, Soltani et al., 2012; asso-
ciative accumulation model, Bhatia, 2013;
multiattribute linear ballistic accumulator, True-
blood et al., 2014; multialternative decision by
sampling, Noguchi & Stewart, 2018).
The first multiattribute choice experiments
demonstrating the attraction effect (e.g., Huber
et al., 1982; Simonson & Tversky, 1992) almost
exclusively used stylized stimuli with objec-
tively defined attribute dimensions (e.g., cars
presented as numerical values for gas mileage
and ride quality). Trueblood et al. (2013) have
also found evidence for the attraction effect in a
perceptual choice experiment, where partici-
pants were asked to select the largest from three
rectangles with varying widths and heights.
However, recent research suggests that the
attraction effect might only occur under very
specific conditions. In particular, it had been
shown that the effect is much more likely to
manifest when an attribute-wise comparison
strategy is employed in the choice process, as
opposed to an alternative-wise strategy (Nogu-
chi & Stewart, 2014). In addition, the attraction
effect seems to be highly dependent on the exact
presentation format of the choice options (e.g.,
Cataldo & Cohen, 2019; Frederick et al., 2014;
Spektor et al., 2018). Since stimulus presenta-
tion format fundamentally affects the underly-
ing comparison strategy, a natural concern is
then whether this hugely influential decision
bias generalizes to real-world choice situations
with nonstylized alternatives (i.e., options that
cannot be represented with objectively defined
attribute dimensions).
Choice options that are represented along two
attribute dimensions (perceptual or numerical)
can be relatively easily manipulated within a
choice experiment, but most real-world choices
involve complex, naturalistic objects with a
large number of underlying attributes that often
cannot be represented in a stylized format.
These naturalistic options are represented in a
pictorial format without objectively defined at-
tributes.
Recent experiments in multiattribute choice
introduced what can perhaps be considered as
more ecologically valid stimuli (e.g., movies
presented as thumbnails and titles on Netflix or
photographs of popular snacks). Results from
these experiments indicate that significant dif-
ferences might exist in the processing of styl-
ized and nonstylized (naturalistic) stimuli. For
example, Bhatia and Stewart (2018) find that,
with naturalistic stimuli, the weighted additive
model on a high-dimensional semantic repre-
sentation generalizes to new choices better than
the simpler heuristic models that perform so
well on stimuli presented in a stylized format.
Recently, the existence of the attraction effect
in choices that involve naturalistic options has
become a contentious issue in the decision-
making literature. Based on 38 experiments,
Frederick et al. (2014) presented an extensive
investigation of the boundary conditions of the
attraction effect. These experiments included
choice options represented with numerical attri-
butes, as well as complex, real-world stimuli
(e.g., fruits, bottled water, apartments), and in
some of these experiments, participants could
even sample the choice options (e.g., Kool-Aid,
facial tissue, jelly beans). The overall conclu-
sion of this study was that while the presence of
the decoy seemed to affect choices when the
options were represented in a numerical format,
it was absent in experiments with more com-
plex, naturalistic stimuli. In light of these re-
sults, Frederick et al. posited that the psycho-
logical processes underlying decisions where
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options are represented with numerical attri-
butes are fundamentally different from those
employed in decisions where the stimuli have a
more naturalistic format. This conclusion was
also supported by Yang and Lynn (2014), who
demonstrated difficulties replicating the attrac-
tion effect in experiments where the stimuli had
qualitative-verbal or pictorial depictions, as op-
posed to cases where the attributes were pre-
sented numerically.
These two studies sparked considerable inter-
est among decision-making researchers and led
to the reexamination of the boundary conditions
of the attraction effect. While the results from
these studies are consistent in showing no evi-
dence for the attraction effect across a wide
variety of naturalistic choice options, the degree
to which the individual experiments presented
in these studies invoked an attraction effect–
type choice scenario, thus constituting a strin-
gent test of the attraction effect, has been sub-
sequently questioned.
In particular, Huber et al. (2014) discussed
five critical conditions that can inhibit the at-
traction effect and argued that many of these are
present in the experiments reported by Freder-
ick et al. (2014) and Yang and Lynn (2014). The
five critical conditions are to avoid (a) strong
prior preferences over the target and competitor,
(b) inability to identify the dominance relation-
ship between the target and the decoy, (c) het-
erogeneity in prior preferences over the target
and competitor, (d) an undesirable decoy, and
(e) a decoy that is too desirable. In addition,
Simonson (2014) further stressed the impor-
tance of detecting the dominance relationship in
observing the attraction effect.
Due to the theoretical significance of the at-
traction effect, it is important to know if the
attraction effect is confined to choice settings
with stimuli presented in an attribute-by-
alternative format. Arguably, while most con-
sumer choices in the real world involve stimuli
that are often presented in a rich naturalistic
form (Bhatia & Stewart, 2018), the develop-
ment of formal models of choice has been al-
most exclusively reliant on results from exper-
iments where the options are represented with
numerical attributes. Exploring how the
strength of the effect depends on the presenta-
tion format of the choice alternatives also pro-
vides us with invaluable information about the
cognitive process underlying the attraction ef-
fect.
In this article, we describe a rigorous test of
the attraction effect with complex, naturalistic
choice options, using a carefully developed ex-
perimental methodology that addresses all of
the critical conditions discussed by Huber et al.
(2014). Our results show a precisely zero attrac-
tion effect. Taken together with earlier results
from Frederick et al. (2014) and Yang and Lynn
(2014), we see this as strong evidence for the
claim that the attraction effect is limited to
choice tasks where options are represented in a
stylized format with objectively defined attri-
butes.
Testing the Attraction Effect With
Real-World Stimuli
The goal of this experiment was to test the
attraction effect with naturalistic stimuli. We
chose to use the most popular movies on IMDb
as stimuli. Choosing between movies is a real-
istic, everyday task. In addition, the movie
space is rich, and thus it allows us to create a
wide range of unique choice triplets to test the
attraction effect.
When the stimuli are represented with well-
defined attribute dimensions, it is straightfor-
ward to construct choice triplets with a target,
competitor, and decoy option. However, with
naturalistic stimuli, this task is significantly
more complicated. First, such stimuli can have a
high number of attribute dimensions that might
vary across individuals. In addition, it is entirely
possible that preferences are not monotonic
over these attribute dimensions (while this
could also be the case for alternative-by-
attribute representations, these dimensions are
usually constructed to ensure monotonic prefer-
ences, e.g., probability of winning, amount to
win).
Frederick et al. (2014) have also used movie
stimuli in two of their experiments: They chose
pairs of movies that are part of the same series
or are starring the same actor to create target–
decoy pairs. In these experiments, the role of
each of the three movies (target, competitor,
decoy) was always the same for all participants
and based upon average population-level rat-
ings rather than individual ratings.
Our novel experimental design takes individ-
ual preferences into account when creating tar-
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get–competitor–decoy triplets and ensures that
decision makers are indifferent between the tar-
get and competitor and are able to clearly iden-
tify the lowest-rated option in the choice set. To
increase the statistical power of our experiment,
we used a within-subjects design. We presented
participants with both A, B, A= and B, A, B=
triplet pairs (where X= is the dominated option).
Two triplet pairs were created from “quadru-
plets” of movies, using two distinctly different
target–decoy pairs. Figure 1 shows an example
of two choice triplets created from one such
quadruplet of movies (in the experiment partic-
ipants were presented with real movie posters).
Method
Preregistration
The study design, exclusion criteria, and all
the analyses were planned and registered before
we collected any choice data. The preregistration
can be accessed here https://osf.io/fme6c/?view_
only31da4193689f4247a76af93b2f98fcef.
Candidate Choice Set Selection
To determine the choice sets used in the
experiment, the first step was to create a set of
quadruplets, each consisting of two movies that
are very similar (for the two target–decoy pairs;
i.e., A–A,= B–B=), while making sure that the
two pairs are sufficiently different from each
other (for the target–competitor pair; i.e., A–B).
The details of the construction of these qua-
druplets are somewhat arbitrary—a different
recipe could have been used. However, the main
point is that the choice triplets created from
these quadruplets pass Huber et al.’s (2014)
criteria, as we detail below. The main steps in
the quadruplet construction process we describe
in detail in the remainder of this section are
depicted in Figure 2.
To obtain the set of 400 movies, we first
retrieved 40 of the most popular movies from
each of 10 distinct genre categories (romance,
drama, sci-fi, thriller, comedy, horror, anima-
tion, fantasy, crime, action) from IMDb. The
popularity of each movie was defined by the
number of ratings it has received. We selected a
wide range of genres to obtain a sufficiently rich
stimuli space, as we wanted our participants to
have a variety of preferences over our stimuli.
We omitted any sequels.
Due to the multidimensional nature of the
stimuli, one of the main difficulties in creating
attraction effect choice triplets from real-world
Figure 1
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Note. In the experiment, participants were presented with actual movie posters.
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objects is establishing a criterion for matching
up similar objects. We used genre and subgenre
information from the website allmovie.com to
create target–decoy pairs with many shared
genres that are likely to be perceived as similar,
and target–competitor pairs with no genre over-
lap that are likely to be perceived as different.
We conjectured that it will be harder to find
movie pairs that will be perceived as similar, be-
cause any given movie is similar to only a few
movies and dissimilar to all of the others. For this
reason, we started the quadruplet creation with
selecting potential target–decoy pairs.
The genre information on allmovie.com is
very rich: Compared to the 18 genre categories
on IMDb, there are 156 genre and subgenre
categories, capturing many important aspects of
the movies. Using this rich genre information,
we created a movie-by-movie (400  400) ma-
trix, where each cell was the number of over-
lapping genre categories between the two mov-
ies. We selected a movie pair as target–decoy
candidate if, for a given target candidate movie,
the number of overlapping genres with a candi-
date decoy was equal to the maximum overlap
seen for that target across all candidate decoy
movies. This resulted in 2,271 target–decoy
candidate movie pairs overall. We also added
806 movie pairs obtained from the mutually
closest 10% of movies based on a latent seman-
tic analysis1 that were not already in our list of
target–decoy candidates. The rationale behind
using semantic proximity as an additional crite-
rion was to capture movie pairs that are very
close to each other in terms of the story themes
but are not the closest on the genre dimension.
Overall, we had 3,011 unique target–decoy can-
didate pairs at this point.
We then reduced the size of this list by se-
lecting the most similar movie pairs. This was
done manually by two researchers, who inde-
pendently judged the similarity of each movie
pair (not similar at all/similar). We then only
kept the movie pairs that were judged as similar
by both researchers, weeding out the movie
pairs that were obviously not similar, resulting
in 1,242 target–decoy candidates. We then di-
vided the 1,242 pairs into six groups of 207
pairs and ran a pilot study where we asked 60
1 The latent semantic analysis assesses the similarity of
two items based on the text associated with them. For this
analysis, we used the summary text about the movies as well
as plot keywords, actor names, and director names, all
retrieved from IMDb.
Figure 2
Summary of the Quadruplet Construction Process
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participants to rate the similarity of a randomly
chosen group of movie pairs, obtaining 10 in-
dependent similarity ratings for each of the
1,242 target– decoy candidates. Participants
rated the similarity of each movie pair on a 1–7
scale, which also included a “don’t know” op-
tion. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the
average similarity ratings for each movie pair.
We decided to only use movie pairs with
average ratings that are equal to or higher than
4.5, which corresponds to the upper 20% of the
similarity rating distribution (253 movie pairs).
This procedure intended to ensure that our tar-
get–decoy pairs will be perceived as similar by
most people.
Having determined the final set of target–
decoy pairs, the next step in creating the qua-
druplets was to find suitable target–competitor
pairs. Each quadruplet consists of two distinctly
different target–decoy pairs (e.g., The Godfa-
ther–Goodfellas vs. Friends With Benefits–
Knocked Up in Figure 1), where the target–
competitor pair is the highest-rated movie from
each target– decoy pair (The Godfather and
Friends With Benefits in the example). In the
attraction effect, the target and decoy options
have to be as similar as possible, whereas the
target and competitor options need to be dis-
tinctly different. Therefore, we decided to pair
up the least similar 253 target– decoy pairs
(where similarity is captured by genre overlap)
to create the quadruplets.
To do this, we first created a target–decoy
pair by target–decoy pair matrix (253  253),
where each cell was the number of overlapping
genre categories (obtained from IMDb) be-
tween the two movie pairs. For example, con-
sidering the comparison between target–decoy
Pair 1 (consisting of Movie A and Movie B) and
target–decoy Pair 2 (consisting of Movie C and
Movie D), we summed the number of genre
overlaps between movies A–C, A–D, B–C, and
B–D. We then selected the unique target–decoy
pairs that had no genre overlap with each other.
This resulted in 20,022 quadruplets, each of
which is a combination of four movies (created
from two movie pairs, where each movie is
similar to its pair but distinctly different from
the two movies in the other pair), created from
231 unique movies. The quadruplets used for
each participant are based upon their own rat-
ings of the 231 movies, as we describe below.
The list of movie triplets used in the experiment
can be found here https://osf.io/fme6c/?view_
only31da4193689f4247a76af93b2f98fcef.
Figure 3
The Distribution of the Average Similarity Rating for Each Target–Decoy Candi-
date Pair (N  1,242)
Note. The dotted line is the cutoff value for accepting a movie pair as similar. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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Experimental Procedures
The experiment consisted of three stages: rat-
ing stage, choice stage, and a similarity rating
stage. In the rating stage, we asked for partici-
pants’ subjective evaluations over the 231 mov-
ies (“How do you personally rate this movie?”)
on a scale from 1 (worst) to 7 (best). We also
asked whether the participant had seen the
movie before. The 231 movies were presented
in a random order for each participant to ensure
that preference ratings are generalizable across
movies from different genres. The rating stage
took about 15–20 min.
Before the choice stage, we created a bespoke
set of movie triplets for each participant using
their ratings from the rating stage. First, based
on each participant’s preference ratings, we
identified the subset of quadruplets where (a)
the target and competitor were both rated 4,
both rated 5, both rated 6, or both rated 7 and (b)
the two decoy movies were rated at least 3
points lower than the two target candidates.
Note that we did not require the two decoys in
the quadruplet to have the same rating, as it
would have severely limited the number of eli-
gible quadruplets (e.g., we allowed for quadru-
plets with ratings 7,7 for the two targets and 4,1
for the two decoys, respectively), but we con-
trolled for this difference in our analysis.
We then selected the subset of quadruplets
where all of the movies had been seen or none
of the movies had been seen, to make sure that
choice behavior would not be governed by dif-
ferences in familiarity with the movies. The
result was a bespoke subset of quadruplets for
each participant, where the target–competitor
movies had the same rating and the decoy mov-
ies were rated worse. However, we did not want
the same movie to appear twice as a target–
competitor for one participant, and for this rea-
son, we used a sequential elimination technique:
We first chose the quadruplet with the highest
combined target–decoy similarity rating, then
eliminated all quadruplets with the same target–
competitor movies. We repeated these steps un-
til we had a set a of quadruplets with unique
target–competitor movies.
We only invited those participants back for
whom we could create at least three unique
quadruplets (corresponding to at least six attrac-
tion effect choice triplets, two per each quadru-
plet). In the choice stage, people were presented
with the selected movie triplets in a random
order and were asked to choose the one they
liked the most by clicking on the relevant movie
poster (see Figure 4).
In the final, similarity stage, we asked partic-
ipants to rate the similarity of all target–decoy
and target–competitor pairs (“How similar do
you think these movies are?”) on a scale from 1
(least similar) to 7 (most similar), where a
“don’t know” option was also included. Infor-
mation collected in this similarity rating stage
was important to check that in the choice stage,
participants perceived the target–decoy pairs as
similar and the target–competitor pairs as dif-
ferent.
We collected data in batches of 50, until we
had choice data for at least 100 participants
(after all the exclusion criteria had been ap-
plied). At most, a few days passed between the
rating and choice stage. We recruited 297 Eng-
lish-speaking participants from Prolific Aca-
demic who were paid €8 per hour. Out of the
297 participants who completed the rating
stage, we could create quadruplets for 179 par-
ticipants. Out of the 179 participants who were
invited back, 152 took part in the choice stage
of the experiment. We did not collect any data
about the demographics of our sample, as we
did not expect it to affect our results.
Exclusion Criteria
To conduct a rigorous test of the attraction
effect, it is crucial that people take the task
Figure 4
Choice Stage
Note. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
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seriously and reveal their true preferences.
Given that individually rating 231 movies can
seem somewhat mundane, we specified a set of
exclusion criteria to filter those people out who
did not take the rating task sufficiently seri-
ously. These were the following. We excluded
people who fell into the fastest 5% of the reac-
tion time (RT) distribution, the lowest 5% of the
entropy distribution, and the upper and lower
5% of the autocorrelation distribution. Entropy
refers to the diversity of the ratings, while au-
tocorrelation takes into account the temporal
pattern and measures the extent to which a
response depends on previous responses. Thus,
this procedure filtered out response patterns
where people (a) spent an unusually short time
completing the task, (b) did not use the whole of
the ratings scale, (c) often gave the same ratings
for consecutive movies, or (d) were giving rat-
ings randomly.
These exclusion criteria were validated in a
pilot study, where we collected ratings for a set
of books, and included repeat trials. The partic-
ipants filtered out by these three criteria were
the ones who gave the least consistent ratings to
repeated stimuli (correlation r  .8).
When we applied these exclusion criteria to
our sample of 152 people, 17 participants were
filtered out, leaving a sample of 2,148 choices
from 135 participants. When testing for the at-
traction effect, we have also removed all trials
where the decoy was chosen.
Results
The median number of choice trials per par-
ticipant was 16 (range: 6–54), and 84% of par-
ticipants were presented with at least 8 choice
trials. The decoy was only chosen in 4.3% of the
trials. In addition, 72% of participants never
chose the decoy, and only 2% chose it in more
than 25% of the trials. The fact that participants
only chose the lowest-rated option very rarely in
the choice stage suggests that they reported their
preferences truthfully in the rating stage.
In the attraction effect, the decoy increases
the choice share of the target at the expense of
the competitor. Figure 5 shows the proportions
of trials where the target was chosen instead of
the competitor (excluding all trials where the
decoy was chosen, as specified in our preregis-
tration). Each point corresponds to a participant.
The mean proportion of trials where the target
was chosen is M  .50, 95% CI [.49, .51],
which demonstrates that participants were al-
most perfectly indifferent between the target
and the competitor and that the attraction effect
is virtually zero. The proportion of trials where
the target was chosen shows substantial varia-
tion for participants who were presented with
relatively fewer choice trials, whereas it is more
narrowly concentrated around .5 for participants
with a higher number of trials. Overall, a one-
sample t test shows that the proportion of trials
where the target was chosen is not significantly
higher than .5, t(134)  .44, p  .669.
We created the choice triplets carefully so
that the target-decoy pairs would be perceived
as similar and the target-competitor pairs would
be perceived as different. To ensure that our
participants indeed perceived the triplets this
way, we compared the distribution of the tar-
Figure 5
The Proportion of Trials Where the Target Was






























































































































Note. Each dot is a participant. Dots are jittered slightly.
The dot and error bars at Mean of all show the boot-
strapped mean and 95% CI under stratified sampling (by
participant). See the online article for the color version of
this figure.
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get–decoy and target–competitor similarity rat-
ings. As Figure 6 shows, the overwhelming
majority of target–competitor pairs were per-
ceived as not similar, while the majority of
target–decoy pairs were perceived as similar,
exactly as we intended.
To account for subject-specific variability,
we also estimated the likelihood of choosing the
target with an intercept-only mixed-effects lo-
gistic regression with by-subjects intercepts
(see Model 1 in Table 1). The odds of 1 for
choosing the target over the competitor reflect
equal preference for the target and competitor
and corresponds to the choice proportion of .5
in Figure 5. Using Model 1, we calculate that
the overall probability of choosing the target is
.50, 95% CI [.48, .52], the same as what we see
in the mean over subject proportions from Fig-
ure 5.
We also ran a mixed-effects logistic regres-
sion with by-subjects intercepts to investigate
how participants’ target– decoy and target–
competitor similarity ratings, familiarity with
the movies, and target–decoy preference rating
difference affect the likelihood of choosing the
target (see Model 2 in Table 1). The sample size
is slightly smaller because people giving “don’t
know” ratings were not included. None of the
ratings modulate the strength of the attraction
effect. The overall probability of choosing the
target is .50, 95% CI [.44, .55], with a slightly
wider confidence interval. The conclusion from
the two models and the simple mean over pro-
portions is the same: We estimate a precisely
zero attraction effect.
Further Analyses
During the peer-review process, we also
completed the following exploratory analyses.
The analyses in this section were not preregis-
tered.
Our experimental design ensured that for
each bespoke A–B movie pair, participants
were presented with both A, B, A= and B, A, B=
triplets. Faced with two subsequent choices in-
volving two equally highly rated A–B movie
Figure 6
Distribution of the Target–Competitor and Tar-
get–Decoy Similarity Ratings
Note. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
Table 1
Odds Ratios and 95% CIs From Two Mixed-Effects Logistic Models Fit by
Maximum Likelihood With Subject-Specific Intercepts
Variable
Dependent variable: Target chosen
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 1.001 [0.918, 1.091] 0.987 [0.802, 1.214]
Seen all 1.046 [0.690, 1.587]
TC similarity rating 0.981 [0.895, 1.075]
TD similarity rating 0.960 [0.877, 1.050]
TD rating difference 0.944 [0.863, 1.032]
Observations 2,055 1,953
Loglikelihood 1,424.417 1,352.312
Akaike information criterion 2,852.834 2,716.624
Bayesian information criterion 2,864.090 2,750.087
Note. Ratings have been scaled. Seen all is coded 0.5 (yes) and 0.5 (no). T  target; C 
competitor; D  decoy.
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pairs and two different but undesirable decoys,
it is possible that the first choice is “sticky” and
will be repeated. If this is the case, then we can
expect that the target and the competitor will be
chosen exactly half of the time (as the Target A
in A, B, A= is the Competitor A in A, B, B=),
resulting in a perfectly zero attraction effect.
Indeed, participants were overwhelmingly
likely to stick with their first choice, as they
only switched between A and B in 8.5% of
cases (out of the 990 bespoke A–B pairs where
the decoy was not chosen on either the first or
second trial). Out of these 84 cases when par-
ticipants switched, 48 times they chose the tar-
get both times and 36 times they chose the
competitor both times (as the target and com-
petitor movies had changed roles in the second
choice). Thus, 57%, 95% CI [46%, 68%] of
switches were in the direction predicted by the
attraction effect, which is not significantly
higher than the chance level of 50%, 2(1, N 
84)  1.44, p  .115.
We have also analyzed the first choice par-
ticipants made for each A–B pair, discarding the
second, possibly “sticky” choice. After exclud-
ing individual trials where the decoy was cho-
sen, we found no evidence that the proportion of
trials where the target was chosen (M  .49)
was different from .5 on the first choice,
t(134)  .039, p  .969, 95% CI [.46, .52].
Using only the first choices, we repeated the
analyses presented in Table 1 (see Models 3 and
4 in Table 2) and also tested the effect of vari-
ous additional controls, including familiarity
with the movies; target–competitor and target–
decoy similarity ratings; target–decoy prefer-
ence rating difference; target preference rating;
display order of target, competitor, and decoy;
overall number of choices; current trial number;
and RT (Model 5). When all covariates are
included, we find some evidence that the larger
the preference difference between the target and
decoy, the less likely that the target will be
chosen. Using Model 5, we estimate that the
overall probability of choosing the target is .50,
95% CI [.39, .59].
Our experimental design relies on the as-
sumption that participants should be indifferent
between equally highly rated movies from dif-
ferent genres. However, if the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying the evaluation and choice
stages are different, then discrepancies between
Table 2
Odds Ratios and 95% CIs From Three Mixed-Effects Logistic Models Fit by Maximum Likelihood With
Subject-Specific Intercepts, First Choices Only
Variable
Dependent variable: Target chosen
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept 0.936 [0.830, 1.056] 0.868 [0.652, 1.148] 0.996 [0.634, 1.458]
Seen all 1.180 [0.674, 2.096] 1.116 [0.631, 1.994]
TD similarity rating 0.922 [0.816, 1.041] 0.924 [0.817, 1.046]
TC similarity rating 0.890 [0.782, 1.009] 0.896 [0.787, 1.017]
TD rating difference 0.892 [0.791, 1.005] 0.856 [0.749, 0.977]
Target rating 1.116 [0.971, 1.285]
Order: CTD 1.069 [0.707, 1.622]
Order: DCT 0.665 [0.443, 1.000]
Order: DTC 0.830 [0.546, 1.261]
Order: TCD 0.817 [0.536, 1.243]
Order: TDC 0.824 [0.540, 1.261]
Number of choices 1.002 [0.988, 1.017]
Current trial number 0.998 [0.977, 1.019]
Reaction time 1.043 [0.947, 1.213]
Observations 1,065 1,014 1,014
Loglikelihood 737.627 697.223 692.772
Akaike information criterion 1,479.253 1,406.446 1,415.544
Bayesian information criterion 1,489.195 1,435.976 1,489.369
Note. Ratings, rating differences, and reaction time have been scaled. Seen all is coded 0.5 (yes) and 0.5 (no).
Benchmark for order variables is CDT. T  target; C  competitor; D  decoy.
 p  .05.
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ratings and choices might arise. For example, it
is possible that the rating reflects preference for
the movie within its genre category, but the
overall choice between two movies with differ-
ent genres is driven by overall genre prefer-
ences.
To address this concern, we first tested
whether overall genre preferences have an in-
fluence on choices over and above the informa-
tion reflected in individual movie ratings by
adding the difference between the target–
competitor genre ratings for each participant to
our regression models described in Table 1
(Models 1 and 2), assuming that average genre
ratings serve as a suitable proxy for overall
genre preferences. The results in Table 3 show
that overall genre preferences do not change our
previous estimate of the attraction effect when
added to an intercept-only regression (Model 6).
When all of the covariates are included (Model
8), we still do not find evidence for the attrac-
tion effect, although the effect is less precisely
estimated. We also repeated these analyses us-
ing first choices only (see Models 7 and 9), with
very similar results.
Second, to determine whether overall genre
preferences for the target and competitor influ-
ence the strength of the attraction effect, we
tested the attraction effect using the subset of
trials where overall genre preferences were
roughly equal. Using a one-sample t test on a
subset of trials where absolute difference be-
tween the average target and competitor genre
ratings was less than 0.25 (about 23% of all
trials), we found no evidence that the proportion
of trials where the target was chosen (M  .5)
was higher than .5, t(98)  .142, p  .556,
95% CI [.46, .55].
Overall, while the results indicate that overall
genre preferences slightly influenced choices
between the target and competitor, we found no
evidence that this had any effect on the strength
of the attraction effect.
The decoy was chosen very rarely, in less
than 5% of trials. Previously, it had been shown
that a decoy that is placed too far from the target
can result in a reverse attraction effect (repul-
sion effect; Spektor et al., 2018). On a 1–7
preference rating scale, we allowed for a mini-
mum distance of 3 and a maximum of 6 be-
tween the target and decoy. While we have not
found any evidence suggesting that the target–
decoy rating difference influenced the strength
of the attraction effect (see Model 2 in Table 1),
a nonlinear association between target–decoy
preference and the attraction effect might still
exist. To examine this possibility while control-
ling for the perceived similarity of the target–
decoy pair, we ran a logistic regression model to
predict the probability of choosing the target,
with target–decoy rating difference and their
perceived similarity as explanatory variables.
To test for a potential nonmonotonic relation-
ship, we estimated a separate coefficient for
Table 3
Odds Ratios and 95% CIs From Three Mixed-Effects Logistic Models Fit by Maximum Likelihood With
Subject-Specific Intercepts
Variable
Dependent variable: Target chosen
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Intercept 1.001 [0.918, 1.091] 0.941 [0.834, 1.061] 0.989 [0.83, 1.217] 0.875 [0.657, 1.157]
Genre rating difference 1.080 [0.990, 1.178] 1.080 [0.958, 1.218] 1.101 [1.007, 1.204] 1.075 [0.949, 1.219]
Seen all 1.042 [0.687, 1.581] 1.173 [0.669, 2.083]
TC similarity rating 0.980 [0.895, 1.074] 0.893 [0.784, 1.013]
TD similarity rating 0.960 [0.877, 1.050] 0.920 [0.814, 1.039]
TD rating difference 0.947 [0.866, 1.036] 0.893 [0.791, 1.006]
Observations 2,055 1,065 1,953 1,014
Loglikelihood 1,422.902 736.835 1,350.093 696.577
Akaike information criterion 2,851.803 1,479.670 2,714.186 1,407.153
Bayesian information criterion 2,868.687 1,494.582 2,753.226 1,441.605
Note. Models 6 and 8 are estimated using the whole sample, whereas Models 7 and 9 are estimated using first choices only.
Ratings, rating differences, and reaction time have been scaled. Seen all is coded 0.5 (yes) and 0.5 (no). T  target; C 
competitor; D  decoy.
 p  .05.
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each level of the explanatory variables. Figure 7
shows the predicted probabilities from this anal-
ysis for each combination of target–decoy rat-
ing difference and similarity rating, using first
choices only. The pattern of these predicted
values does not indicate that the strength of the
attraction effect varies systematically by the
target–decoy rating difference and similarity
rating.
Finally, it is possible that the strength of the
attraction effect is influenced by the overall
preference for the target and competitor (this is
at least 4 and at most 7 in our experiment). To
explore this possibility, we calculated the pro-
portion of trials where the target was chosen for
each level of target–competitor preference rat-
ing, using first choices only. Figure 8 shows
these proportions, suggesting that target–
competitor preference ratings had no effect on
the strength of the attraction effect.
General Discussion
We tested for the attraction effect in a choice
task with naturalistic choice options. We found
that the presence of the decoy in the choice set
did not alter preferences over the target and the
competitor. Our experiment is the first investi-
gation to rigorously test the attraction effect
with naturalistic stimuli while satisfying the
conditions set out by Huber et al. (2014).
First, we created bespoke choice triplets with
the equal preference ratings for the target and
competitor, with the aim to ensure participants’
indifference between the target and the compet-
itor, maximizing the probability that choices
will be constructed on the spot (rather than
through relying on strong prior preferences) and
that an attraction effect will occur. In a further
analysis, we found that the strength of the at-
traction effect was not influenced by overall
genre preferences.
Second, we have strong evidence that the dom-
inance relationship was perceived in our experi-
ment. The target–decoy similarity ratings con-
firmed that our careful target–decoy selection
process resulted in movie pairs that were per-
ceived as similar. In addition, our choice set con-
struction criteria ensured that the decoy was al-
ways rated at least 3 units lower than the target
(and the competitor). Consequently, the decoy
was only chosen in 4.3% of the trials, which
clearly shows that participants were able to spot
and avoid the dominated option. These choice
patterns strongly suggest that participants ex-
pressed their true preferences, despite the experi-
mental design not being incentive compatible.
Third, by creating bespoke choice triplets
based on the ratings, we avoided individual
Figure 7
The Predicted Proportion of Trials Where the
Target Was Chosen Instead of the Competitor, by






























Target−Decoy rating difference 3 4 5 6
Note. The dot and error bars show model predictions and
95% CIs from a logistic regression with target–decoy
similarity rating and rating difference as explanatory vari-
ables, first choices only.
Figure 8
The Proportion of Trials Where the Target Was
Chosen Instead of the Competitor by Target–Com-
petitor Rating
Note. The dots and error bars show the bootstrapped mean
and 95% CI under stratified sampling (by participant), first
choices only.
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heterogeneity in preferences as a potential con-
found. In addition, we ensured that the decoy is
not too desirable in comparison to the target.
We also used strict preregistered exclusion cri-
teria to filter out participants who did not take
the task sufficiently seriously, and with an av-
erage of 16 choice trials per participant, we
avoided participant fatigue.
Finally, in our analysis, we controlled for
familiarity with the choice options, perceived
similarity of the target– decoy and target–
competitor pair, and preference difference be-
tween the target and the decoy, but we found
that none of these modulated or revealed an
attraction effect. The fact that the preference
difference between the target and the decoy did
not affect the strength of the attraction effect
suggests that our results did not arise from a
potentially undesirable decoy.
In summary, our results are in line with that
of Frederick et al. (2014) and provide strong
evidence that the attraction effect does not ex-
tend to choice between naturalistic options.
While we did not aim to investigate the exact
reason behind why the attraction effect is robust
in choices involving options represented with
numerical attribute dimensions but is absent
from choices involving naturalistic options, we
hypothesize that the separability of the attribute
dimensions is an important factor. For example,
attribute information is spatially separate in a
numerical matrix form presentation, but attri-
bute information occurs in the same spatial lo-
cation for movie thumbnails. Given the evi-
dence that attribute-wise comparison strategies
are key to the attraction effect in numerical or
perceptual choices, such comparison strategies
are less likely to occur with complex, natural-
istic objects where the attributes are not spa-
tially separate. Future research could test this
hypothesis by exploring how the comparison
process and the strength of the attraction effect
vary with different representations of the same
choice options (separate attributes vs. naturalis-
tic representation), extending Frederick et al.’s
investigation of numerical versus visual presen-
tation of the same stimuli. Results from such
experiments could provide us with important
insights about the boundary conditions of the
attraction effect and the cognitive process un-
derlying this choice bias.
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